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Abstract
Incorporating budget constraints into the analysis of auctions has become increasingly im-
portant, as they model practical settings more accurately. The social welfare function, which
is the standard measure of efficiency in auctions, is inadequate for settings with budgets, since
there may be a large disconnect between the value a bidder derives from obtaining an item and
what can be liquidated from her. The Liquid Welfare objective function has been suggested as a
natural alternative for settings with budgets. Simple auctions, like simultaneous item auctions,
are evaluated by their performance at equilibrium using the Price of Anarchy (PoA) measure
– the ratio of the objective function value of the optimal outcome to the worst equilibrium.
Accordingly, we evaluate the performance of simultaneous item auctions in budgeted settings
by the Liquid Price of Anarchy (LPoA) measure – the ratio of the optimal Liquid Welfare to
the Liquid Welfare obtained in the worst equilibrium.
Our main result is that the LPoA for mixed Nash equilibria is bounded by a constant when
bidders are additive and items can be divided into sufficiently many discrete parts. Our proofs
are robust, and can be extended to achieve similar bounds for simultaneous second price auctions
as well as Bayesian Nash equilibria. For pure Nash equilibria, we establish tight bounds on the
LPoA for the larger class of fractionally-subadditive valuations. To derive our results, we develop
a new technique in which some bidders deviate (surprisingly) toward a non-optimal solution. In
particular, this technique does not fit into the smoothness framework.
1 Introduction
Budget constraints have become an important practical consideration in most existing auctions, as
reflected in recent literature (see, e.g., [3, 5, 17, 30]), because they model reality more accurately.
The issue of limited liquidity of buyers arises when transaction amounts are large and may exhaust
bidders’ liquid assets, as is the case for privatization auctions in Eastern Europe and FCC spectrum
auctions in the U.S. (see, e.g., [4]). As another example, advertisers in Google Adword auctions
are instructed to specify their budget even before specifying their bids and keywords. Many other
massive electronic marketplaces have a large number of participants with limited liquidity, which
impose budget constraints. Buyers would not borrow money from a bank to partake in multiple
auctions on eBay, and even with available credit, they only have a limited amount of attention,
so that in aggregate they cannot spend too much money by participating in every auction online.
Finally, budget constraints also arise in small scale systems, such as the reality TV show Storage
Wars, where people participate in cash-only auctions to win the content of an expired storage locker
with an unknown asset.
Maximizing social welfare is a classic objective function that has been extensively studied within
the context of resource allocation problems, and auctions in particular. The social welfare of an
allocation is the sum of agents’ valuations for their allocated bundles. Unfortunately, in settings
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where agents have limited budgets (hereafter, budgeted settings), the social welfare objective fails
to accurately capture what happens in practice. Consider, for example, an auction in which there
are two bidders and one item to be allocated among the bidders. One bidder has a high value but
a very small budget, while the second bidder has a medium value along with a medium budget. In
this case, a high social welfare is achieved by allocating the item to the bidder who values the item
highly. In contrast, most Internet advertising and electronic marketplaces (such as Google and
eBay) would allocate the item in the opposite way, namely to the bidder with a medium value and
budget due to monetary constraints. Hence, the social welfare objective is a poor model for how
auctions are executed in reality. Indeed, it seems reasonable to favor participants with substantial
investments and engagement in the economical system to maintain a healthy economy.
Following Dobzinski and Paes Leme [18], we measure the efficiency of outcomes in budgeted
settings according to their Liquid Welfare objective, motivated as follows. In the absence of budgets,
the value a buyer obtains from a given bundle captures their willingness-to-pay for the bundle.
According to this interpretation, the social welfare objective captures the maximum revenue a
seller can extract from buyers in a non-strategic setting. In budgeted settings, however, the value
a buyer receives from a bundle no longer captures how much revenue can be extracted from them,
since the revenue that can be extracted from a buyer is bounded by both the buyer’s value and the
buyer’s budget. To reconcile this discrepancy, Dobzinski and Paes Leme [18] proposed to evaluate
the welfare of buyers according to their admissibility-to-pay; that is, the minimum between the
buyer’s value for the allocated bundle and the buyer’s budget. The aggregate welfare according to
this definition is termed the Liquid Welfare (LW). Indeed, the Liquid Welfare is exactly the revenue
a seller can extract from buyers in budgeted, non-strategic settings.
In this work we study the efficiency of simple (non incentive compatible) auctions in budgeted
settings. The standard measure for quantifying the efficiency of simple auctions is the Price of
Anarchy (PoA) [23,28,31], defined as the ratio of the optimal social welfare to the social welfare of
the worst equilibrium. In budgeted settings, it is thus natural to quantify the efficiency of simple
auctions by the Liquid Price of Anarchy (LPoA), defined as the ratio of the optimal Liquid Welfare
to the Liquid Welfare of the worst equilibrium.
A prominent auction format, which has been extensively studied recently, is the simultaneous
item auction setting. In such auctions, buyers submit bids simultaneously on all items, and the
allocation and prices are determined separately for each individual item, based only on the bids
submitted for that item. This format is similar to auctions used in practice (e.g., eBay auctions).
In the long line of works of Christodoulou et al. [14], Bhawalkar and Roughgarden [6], Hassidim et
al. [22], Syrgkanis and Tardos [31], and Feldman et al. [21], it was shown that these simple auctions
have nearly optimal social efficiency guarantees for a broad range of equilibrium concepts when
buyers have complement-free valuations but are not limited by budgets.
The most common framework for analyzing the Price of Anarchy of games and auctions is the
smoothness framework (see, e.g., [28, 31]). Such techniques usually involve a thought experiment
in which each player deviates toward some strategy related to the optimal solution, and hence the
total utility of all players can be bounded appropriately. One important and necessary condition
for applying the smoothness framework is that the objective function dominate the sum of utilities
(which holds for social welfare). However, this technique falls short in the case of Liquid Welfare,
since a bidder’s utility can be arbitrarily higher than their value, and in aggregate, bidders may
achieve a total utility that is much larger than the Liquid Welfare at equilibrium. To overcome this
issue, we develop new techniques to bound the LPoA in budgeted settings. Our techniques include
a novel type of hypothetical deviation that is used to upper bound the aggregate utility of bidders
(in addition to the traditional deviation that is used to lower bound it), and the consideration of a
special set of carefully chosen bidders to engage in these hypothetical deviations (see more details
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in the “Our Techniques” section below). To the best of our knowledge, most prior techniques,
including those that depart from the smoothness framework (e.g., [21]), examine the utility derived
when every player deviates toward the optimal solution.
With our new techniques at hand, we address the following question: What is the Liquid Price
of Anarchy of simultaneous item auctions in settings with budgets?
Our Contributions
We show that simultaneous item auctions achieve nearly optimal performance (i.e., a constant
Liquid Price of Anarchy) in many cases of interest.
Our main result concerns the case in which agent valuations are additive (i.e., agent i’s value
for item j is vij and the value for a set of items is the sum of the individual valuations).
Main theorem: For simultaneous item auctions (first and second price) with additive bidders,
the LPoA with respect to mixed Nash equilibria and Bayesian Nash equilibria is constant. This
assumes a divisible model where items can be divided into sufficiently many discrete parts.
We also show that for pure Nash equilibria, our results hold for more general settings.
Theorem: For simultaneous item auctions (first and second price) with fractionally-subadditive
bidders, the LPoA of pure Nash equilibria is 2, even in the indivisible model. This is tight.
The following remarks are in order:
1. In settings without budgets, simultaneous item auctions reduce to m independent auctions
(where m is the number of items). In contrast, when agents have budget constraints, the
separate auctions exhibit non-trivial dependencies even under additive valuations.
2. Our main result requires that every item can be divided into at least Ω(n) parts (where n is
the number of agents). If items can only be divided into a sublinear number of parts, then
the LPoA is super constant.
3. Our LPoA result for pure Nash equilibria (in the indivisible model) holds for deterministic tie-
breaking rules. Surprisingly, if the tie-breaking rule is randomized, then the LPoA becomes
linear in n (even if agents play pure strategies and have additive valuations).
Our Techniques
The most common framework for analyzing the Price of Anarchy of games and auctions is the
smoothness framework (see, e.g., [28,31]). One important and necessary condition for applying the
smoothness framework is that the objective function dominate the sum of utilities, which clearly
holds in the typical case of the social welfare objective, but not the Liquid Welfare objective.
To overcome this obstacle, we introduce two new ideas. (1) In addition to deriving a lower
bound on the sum of bidders’ utilities (following the traditional deviations-towards-the-optimum
technique), we also derive an upper bound on their utility as a function of the Liquid Welfare,
using a novel boosting deviation, in which bidders bid more aggressively on items they receive in
equilibrium. (2) Instead of summing the utility across all bidders, we consider the utility derived
from a carefully selected set of bidders.
Our analysis can be summarized by the following inequality: let LW(b) denote the expected
Liquid Welfare of a bid profile b, OPT denote the optimal Liquid Welfare, and ui(b) denote the
expected utility of bidder i under a bid profile b. For any equilibrium b, there exists a set of bidders
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S and constants c1 < 1 and c2 > 1, such that
c1 ·OPT ≤
∑
i∈S
ui(b) ≤ c2 · LW(b),
where the left inequality follows from the traditional deviations-towards-the-optimum technique,
and the right inequality follows from the new boosting deviation technique.
Syrgkanis and Tardos [31] also addressed the PoA of simple auctions in settings with budgets.
They showed that the social welfare (SW) at equilibrium is at least a constant fraction of the
optimal Liquid Welfare. One might be tempted to leverage their results for bounding the LPoA.
This approach, however, is inadequate, since the LW at equilibrium can be arbitrarily smaller than
the SW at equilibrium, even if items can be divided into arbitrarily many parts (e.g., if all budgets
are small and values are large)1. For this reason, the LPoA bounds we establish carry over to
their setting, but not vice versa2. Since the focus of [31] was to bound the SW at equilibrium (as
opposed to LW), they established their bounds using the smoothness framework. In particular, they
developed a powerful composition framework, in which they first obtained results for single-item
auctions, and then showed that such auctions compose well to obtain more general results with
any number of players and items. Note that it is not clear whether the composition framework is
applicable in our setting.
Related Work
There is a vast literature in algorithmic game theory that incorporates budgets into the design
of incentive compatible mechanisms. The paper of [5] showed that, in the case of one infinitely
divisible good, the adaptive clinching auction is incentive compatible under some assumptions.
Moreover, the work of [30] initiated the design of incentive compatible mechanisms in the context
of reverse auctions, where the payments of the auctioneer cannot exceed a hard budget constraint
(follow-up works include [1,3,13,19]). A great deal of work focused on designing incentive compatible
mechanisms that approximately maximize the auctioneer’s revenue in various settings with budget-
constrained bidders [8, 11, 24, 26, 27]. Some works analyzed how budgets affect markets and non-
truthful mechanisms [4, 12].
The earlier work [17] on multi-unit auctions with budget constraints concerns the design of
incentive compatible mechanisms that always produce Pareto-optimal allocation. The results in
this line of work are mostly negative with a notable exception of mechanisms based on Ausubel’s
adaptive clinching auction framework [2].
Some recent results concern the design of incentive compatible mechanisms with respect to
the Liquid Welfare objective, introduced by Dobzinski and Paes Leme [18]. They gave a constant
approximation for the auction that sells a single divisible good to additive buyers with budgets. In
a follow-up work, Lu and Xiao [25] gave an O(1)-approximation for bidders with general valuations
in the single-item setting.
A large body of literature is concerned with simultaneous item bidding auctions. These simple
auctions have been studied from a computational perspective, including the papers of Cai and
1Note that the SW at equilibrium can be arbitrarily larger than the optimal LW, so the ratio studied by Syrgkanis
and Tardos [31] can be either smaller or greater than 1. Our results imply that whenever the LW at equilibrium is
more than a constant factor smaller than the SW at equilibrium, it must be the case that the optimal LW is also
more than a constant factor smaller than the SW at equilibrium.
2Note, however, that in some sense our results and those of [31] are incomparable. Although the bounds we estab-
lish on the LPoA imply bounds according to their PoA measure, they achieved results for more general equilibrium
concepts and valuation functions in some settings.
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Papadimitriou [9] and Dobzinski et al. [16]. There is also extensive work addressing the Price of
Anarchy of such simple auctions (see [29] for more general Price of Anarchy results). The work
of Christodoulou et al. [14] initiated the study of simultaneous item auctions within the Price of
Anarchy framework. The authors showed that, for second price auctions, the social welfare of every
Bayesian Nash equilibrium is a 2-approximation to the optimal social welfare, even for players with
fractionally-subadditive valuation functions. A large amount of follow-up work [6, 7, 15, 20–22, 31]
made significant progress in our understanding of simultaneous item auctions, but none of these
works measures inefficiency with respect to the Liquid Welfare objective.
The two most closely related works to ours are those of Syrgkanis and Tardos [31], along with
Caragiannis and Voudouris [10], which both take the Liquid Welfare objective into account when
measuring the inefficiency of equilibria. The work of [31] gave a variety of Price of Anarchy re-
sults, focusing on the development of a smoothness framework for broad solution concepts such as
correlated equilibria and Bayesian Nash equilibria, and exploring composition properties of vari-
ous mechanisms. They extended their results to the setting where players are budget-constrained,
achieving similar approximation guarantees when comparing the social welfare achieved at equi-
librium to the optimal Liquid Welfare. In particular, their results imply an e
e−1 -approximation
for simultaneous first price auctions, and a 2-approximation for all-pay auctions and simultaneous
second price auctions under the no-overbidding assumption. While [31] show that the social welfare
at equilibrium cannot be much worse than the optimal Liquid Welfare, one should note that the
social welfare at equilibrium can be arbitrarily better than the optimal Liquid Welfare (e.g., if
all budgets are small, the optimal Liquid Welfare is small). It is useful to note that, in general,
the ratio between the Liquid Welfare at equilibrium and the social welfare at equilibrium can be
arbitrarily bad (if all budgets are small, then the Liquid Welfare of any allocation is small, while
players’ values for received goods can be arbitrarily large).
The paper of Caragiannis and Voudouris [10] also considered the scenario where players have
budgets and studied the same ratio we consider in this paper, namely the Liquid Welfare at equi-
librium to the optimal Liquid Welfare. They studied the proportional allocation mechanism, which
concerns auctioning off one divisible item proportionally according to the bids that players sub-
mit. They showed that, assuming players have concave non-decreasing valuation functions, the
Liquid Welfare at coarse-correlated equilibria and Bayesian Nash equilibria achieve at least a con-
stant fraction of the optimal Liquid Welfare. It should be noted that, for random allocations,
they measure the benchmark at equilibrium ex-ante over the randomness of the allocation, i.e.,∑n
i=1min{Ev-i,B-i [vi(xi)], Bi}, where vi is player i’s valuation, Bi is player i’s budget, and xi de-
notes the allocation player i receives. In contrast, for random allocations, we use the stronger
ex-post measure of the expected Liquid Welfare at equilibrium given by
∑n
i=1 E[min{vi(xi), Bi}].
2 Model and Preliminaries
We consider simultaneous item auctions, in which m heterogeneous items are sold to n bidders
(or players) in m independent auctions. A bidder’s strategy is a bid vector bi ∈ R
m
≥0, where bij
represents player i’s bid for item j. We use b to denote the bid profile b = (b1, . . . , bn), and we
will often use the notation b = (bi,b-i) to denote the strategy profile where player i bids bi and the
remaining players bid according to b-i = (b1, . . . , bi−1, bi+1, . . . , bn).
The outcome of an auction consists of an allocation rule x and payment rule p. The al-
location rule x maps bid profiles to an allocation vector for each individual bidder i, where
xi(b) = (xi1, . . . , xim) denotes the set of items won by player i. In a simultaneous first price
auction, each item j is allocated to the highest bidder (breaking ties according to some rule) and
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the winner pays their bid. The total payment of bidder i is pi(b) =
∑
j∈xi(b)
bij .
Each player i has a valuation function vi, which maps sets of items to R≥0 (vi captures how
much player i values item bundles), and a budget Bi. We assume that all valuations are normalized
and monotone, i.e., vi(∅) = 0 and vi(S) ≤ vi(T ) for any i ∈ [n] and S ⊆ T ⊆ [m]. We mostly
consider bidders with additive valuations, i.e., vi(S) =
∑
j∈S vij (where vij denotes agent i’s value
for item j). The utility ui(xi(b)) of each player i is vi(xi(b)) − pi(b) =
∑
j vij · xij − pi(b) if
pi(b) ≤ Bi; and ui(xi(b)) = −∞ if pi(b) > Bi. Buyers select their bids strategically in order to
maximize utility.
Share model: For our results beyond pure Nash equilibria with deterministic tie-breaking rules,
we focus on bidders with additive valuations and consider a share model, in which item j is divided
into h identical shares and player i values each share at
vij
h
.
Definition 1 (Pure Nash Equilibrium). A bid profile b is a Pure Nash Equilibrium (PNE) if, for
any player i and any deviating bid b′i: ui(bi,b-i) ≥ ui(b
′
i,b-i).
A mixed Nash equilibrium is defined similarly, except that bidding strategies can be randomized
bi ∼ si and utility is measured in expectation over the joint bid distribution s = s1 × · · · × sn.
Definition 2 (Mixed Nash Equilibrium). A bid profile s is a mixed Nash equilibrium if, for any
player i and any deviating bid b′i: Eb∼s[ui(bi,b-i)] ≥ Eb-i∼s-i [ui(b
′
i,b-i)].
Note that, in general, we assume that the bidding space is discretized (i.e., each player can only
bid in multiples of a sufficiently small value ε). This is done to ensure that there always exists a
mixed Nash equilibrium, as otherwise we do not have a finite game.
We now give a definition about the welfare function we seek to optimize.
Definition 3 (Liquid Welfare). The Liquid Welfare, denoted by LW, of an allocation x is given by
LW(x) =
∑
i∈[n]min{vi(xi), Bi}. For random allocations, we use the measure given by LW(x) =∑
i∈[n] E[min{vi(xi), Bi}].
For a given vector of valuations v = (v1, . . . , vn), we use OPT(v) to denote the value of the
optimal outcome given by OPT(v) = maxS1,...,Sn
∑
imin{vi(Si), Bi}, where the sets Si form a
partition of [m] (i.e., ∪iSi = [m] and ∀i 6= j : Si ∩ Sj = ∅). We often use OPT instead of OPT(v)
when the context is clear.
Definition 4 (Liquid Price of Anarchy). Given a fixed valuation profile v, the Liquid Price of
Anarchy (LPoA) is the worst-case ratio between the optimal Liquid Welfare and the expected Liquid
Welfare at a Nash equilibrium (pure or mixed) and is given by
LPoA(v) = sup
s
{
OPT(v)
LW(s(v))
∣∣∣∣ s ∈ Nash Equilibria
}
.
3 Main Result (Liquid Price of Anarchy)
We consider a share model in which each item j is divided into h identical shares, where player i
values each share at
vij
h
(here vij denotes player i’s value for item j). For the sake of analysis, we
treat each share as a separate item, so that buyers can submit different bids on every single share.
A more realistic market clearing mechanism for one item would be one where
1. Each buyer specifies how many shares they want to buy and which price they are willing to
pay per share.
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2. In decreasing order of bids and until the stock of shares lasts, each buyer receives their
demanded number of shares while paying their bid per purchase.
We note that our analysis carries over to this “clearing house” item auction with small adjustments,
which we mention in Section 5 and discuss at the end of this section.
Theorem 1. The Liquid Price of Anarchy of simultaneous first price auctions is constant (at most
51.5), when every item has at least n equal shares (copies). If less shares h are available then the
LPoA is O
(
n
h
)
.
In what follows we build up notation and intuition toward the proof. Recall that agents have
additive valuations and submit bids on shares, and if they receive an xij fraction of shares of item
j, then their value is given by vi(xij) = vij · xij. We further assume that the buyers bid according
to a mixed Nash equilibrium b ∼ s. When buyers bid in simultaneous auctions, this essentially
induces a distribution of prices over all shares of items p ∼ D from a distribution D (e.g., winning
bids in first price auctions, namely pℓj = maxi b
ℓ
ij where b
ℓ
ij is player i’s bid for share ℓ of item j). In
particular, for all items we can define an “expected price per item” at equilibrium or just a “price
per item” as p = (p1, . . . , pm), where pj = α
∑h
ℓ=1 E[p
ℓ
j], for some α > 1 (α = 2 will be sufficient for
us). This induces a natural “expected price per share,” namely
pj
h
. One simple observation about
p is the following:
Observation 3.1. Revenue is related to prices: REV(s) = 1
α
∑m
j=1 pj , where REV(s) denotes the
expected revenue at the equilibrium profile s.
We next show that if players bid on some fraction of shares of item j uniformly at random
according to pj , then they win a large number of shares in expectation.
Claim 3.1. For any item j, if a player bids on a δ-fraction of shares chosen uniformly at random
of item j at a given price
pj
h
per share, then the player receives in expectation at least h · δ ·
(
1− 1
α
)
shares of the item (i.e., at least a δ ·
(
1− 1
α
)
-fraction of item j).
Proof. Suppose towards a contradiction that the expected number of shares won by bidder i is less
than δ · h ·
(
1− 1
α
)
. In particular, it means that
h∑
ℓ=1
Pr [i bids on share ℓ] ·Pr
[
pℓj <
pj
h
]
=
h∑
ℓ=1
δ ·Pr
[
pℓj <
pj
h
]
< δ · h ·
(
1−
1
α
)
.
We further use the definition of pj and Markov’s inequality to obtain a contradiction as follows:
pj
α
=
h∑
ℓ=1
E
[
pℓj
]
≥
h∑
ℓ=1
pj
h
·Pr
[
pℓj ≥
pj
h
]
=
h∑
ℓ=1
pj
h
(
1−Pr
[
pℓj <
pj
h
])
> pj −
pj
h
· h ·
(
1−
1
α
)
.
When relating prices to Liquid Welfare we notice that
Observation 3.2. Revenue is bounded by the Liquid Welfare: REV(s) ≤ LW(s), where LW(s)
denotes the expected Liquid Welfare at the equilibrium profile s.
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We consider the following fractional relaxation of the allocation problem with the goal of opti-
mizing Liquid Welfare.
Maximize
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
vij · zij Liquid linear program (LLP)
Subject to
∑
j
vij · zij ≤ Bi ∀i;
∑
i
zij ≤ 1 ∀j; zij ≥ 0 ∀i, j.
We denote by y = (yij) the optimal solution to LLP. Notice that the optimal fractional solution
for the Liquid Welfare would never benefit from allocating a set of items to a player such that their
value for the set exceeds their budget. The solution to LLP gives an upper bound on the optimal
Liquid Welfare OPT.
Observation 3.3. The optimal fractional solution to LLP is better than the optimal allocation:
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
vij · yij ≥ OPT.
We now define some notation that will be useful in order to obtain our result. We let qij be
the expected fraction of shares that player i receives from item j at an equilibrium strategy s. In
addition, for each agent i, we consider a set of high value items Ji
def
=
{
j | vij ≥ pj
}
. We further
define Qi to be the probability that vi(xi) ≥ Bi at equilibrium (recall that xi denotes the random
set that player i receives in the mixed Nash equilibrium). We also define three sets of bidders, the
first two of which are for budget feasibility reasons and the last of which is for bidders that often
fall under their budget in equilibrium (these sets need not be disjoint). In particular, for a fixed
parameter γ > 1 to be determined later, we define sets I1, I2, and I3:
I1
def
=
{
i
∣∣∣ γ∑
j∈Ji
pj · qij ≤ Bi
}
, I2
def
=
{
i
∣∣∣ ∑
j∈[m]
pj
h
≤ Bi
}
, and I3
def
=
{
i
∣∣∣ Qi ≤ 1
2γ
}
.
Throughout our proof, we focus on bidders in the set I
def
= I1∩I2∩I3. We define sets I1
def
= [n]\I1,
I2
def
= [n] \ I2, I3
def
= [n] \ I3, and I
def
= [n] \ I. To this end, we need to argue that bidders outside
of the set I do not contribute a lot to the Liquid Welfare at equilibrium s.
Claim 3.2. The total budget of players in I is small:
∑
i∈I Bi < α ·
(
γ + n
h
)
·REV(s) +
∑
i∈I3
Bi.
Proof. We first consider agents in I1 and obtain∑
i∈I1
Bi < γ
∑
i∈I1
∑
j∈Ji
pj · qij ≤ γ
∑
i
∑
j∈Ji
pj · qij ≤ γ
∑
j
pj
∑
i:j∈Ji
qij ≤ γ
∑
j
pj ≤ γ · α · REV(s),
where the second to last inequality follows from the fact that
∑
i qij ≤ 1 since we have a valid
fractional allocation. Next, we consider agents in I2 and obtain∑
i∈I2
Bi <
∑
i∈I2
∑
j
pj
h
≤
n
h
∑
j
pj ≤
n
h
· α · REV(s).
Combining these bounds for agents in I1 and I2 we have∑
i∈I
Bi ≤
∑
i∈I1
Bi +
∑
i∈I2
Bi +
∑
i∈I3
Bi ≤ α ·
(
γ +
n
h
)
·REV(s) +
∑
i∈I3
Bi.
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To achieve our result, we essentially consider two main ideas for player deviations in set I (each
idea actually consists of two parts). The first idea is to use the solution to LLP as guidance to
claim that players can extract a large amount of value relative to the optimal solution. However,
for players to deviate, we must first round the fractional solution y into an integral solution (here,
by integral, we mean a multiple of 1
h
since this represents the fraction of shares a player receives out
of h copies). Define the first LLP deviation (integral part) to be b
⌊i⌋
1 = (b
′
i,b-i), where in b
′
i buyer
i bids on a random ⌊yij⌋h-fraction of each item j ∈ Ji with price pj (here, ⌊y⌋h =
⌊y·h⌋
h
and the
bid per share is
pj
h
). Define the second LLP deviation (fractional part) to be b
{i}
1 = (b
′
i,b-i), where
in b′i buyer i bids on a random {yij}h-fraction of each item j ∈ Ji with price pj (here, {y}h =
1
h
if y > 0, and {y}h = 0 otherwise). We note that both LLP deviations b
⌊i⌋
1 and b
{i}
1 are feasible,
since vij ≥ pj for every j ∈ Ji, and
∑
j vij · yij ≤ Bi as y is a solution to LLP along with I ⊆ I2.
Moreover, for any yij, we have ⌊yij⌋h + {yij}h ≥ yij.
Lemma 3.1 (LLP deviations). Buyers in I at equilibrium s derive large value:
∑
i∈I
∑
j
vij · qij ≥
(
1
2
−
1
2α
)OPT− α(1 + γ + n
h
)
REV(s)−
∑
i∈I3
Bi

 .
Proof. For the integral part of the LLP deviation, since Eb∼s[vi(b)] ≥ Eb∼s[ui(b)] and s is a mixed
Nash equilibrium, we have:∑
i∈I
∑
j
vij · qij ≥
∑
i∈I
Eb∼s [ui(b)] ≥
∑
i∈I
Eb-i∼s-i
[
ui
(
b
⌊i⌋
1
)]
≥
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈Ji
(
1−
1
α
)
· ⌊yij⌋h
(
vij − pj
)
, (1)
where to derive the last inequality we use Claim 3.1. Similarly, for the fractional part of the LLP
deviation we have: ∑
i∈I
∑
j
vij · qij ≥
∑
i∈I
Eb∼s [ui(b)] ≥
∑
i∈I
Eb-i∼s-i
[
ui
(
b
{i}
1
)]
≥
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈Ji
(
1−
1
α
)
· {yij}h
(
vij − pj
)
. (2)
Combining Equation (1) and Equation (2) we get
2
∑
i∈I
∑
j
vij · qij ≥
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈Ji
(
1−
1
α
)
· (
⌊
yij⌋h + {yij}h
) (
vij − pj
)
≥
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈Ji
(
1−
1
α
)
· yij
(
vij − pj
)
=
(
1−
1
α
)∑
i∈I
∑
j∈Ji
vij · yij −
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈Ji
pj · yij

 . (3)
We further estimate∑
i∈I
∑
j∈Ji
vij · yij =
∑
i,j
vij · yij −
∑
i∈I
∑
j
vij · yij −
∑
i∈I
∑
j 6∈Ji
vij · yij
≥
∑
i,j
vij · yij −
∑
i∈I
Bi −
∑
i∈I
∑
j 6∈Ji
pj · yij,
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where in the last inequality we used the condition from the LLP that
∑
j vij · yij ≤ Bi and that
vij ≤ pj for each j 6∈ Ji. We substitute the last estimate into Equation (3) and get
2
∑
i∈I
∑
j
vij · qij ≥
(
1−
1
α
)∑
i,j
vij · yij −
∑
i∈I
Bi −
∑
i∈I
∑
j 6∈Ji
pj · yij −
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈Ji
pj · yij


=
(
1−
1
α
)∑
i,j
vij · yij −
∑
i∈I
∑
j
pj · yij −
∑
i∈I
Bi


≥
(
1−
1
α
)OPT− α(1 + γ + n
h
)
REV(s)−
∑
i∈I3
Bi

 ,
where the last inequality follows from the LLP constraint that
∑
i yij ≤ 1 for each j, the observation∑
j pj = α ·REV(s), and Claim 3.2.
We now turn to our second type of deviation, but we need to further restrict the set of items
that players bid on. In particular, we let Γi =
{
j
∣∣∣ qij ≤ 1γ}, and define Gi = Ji ∩ Γi. We now
define the γ-boosting deviation (integral part) as b
⌊i⌋
2 = (b
′
i,b-i), where in b
′
i buyer i bids on a
random ⌊γ · qij⌋h-fraction of each item j ∈ Gi with price pj, where γ > 1 is a constant to be
determined later. Note that each b
⌊i⌋
2 deviation for every i ∈ I is feasible since I ⊆ I1. Similarly,
we define the fractional part of the γ-boosting deviation as b
{i}
2 , which is also a feasible deviation
since I ⊆ I2. Also, since players bid on items in Gi ⊆ Γi, we have ⌊γ · qij⌋h ≤ 1 (we also have
{γ · qij}h ≤ 1, which holds for all items by definition).
Lemma 3.2 (γ-boosting deviation). The value derived by buyers in I is comparable to the Liquid
Welfare obtained at equilibrium:(
1−
2α
γ(α− 1)
)∑
i∈I
∑
j
vij · qij ≤ α ·REV(s) + 2 · LW(s)−
1
γ
∑
i∈I3
Bi.
Proof. For the integral part of the γ-boosting deviation, we can obtain bounds via the Nash equi-
librium condition and Claim 3.1:∑
i∈I
∑
j
vij · qij ≥
∑
i∈I
Eb∼s [ui(b)] ≥
∑
i∈I
Eb-i∼s-i
[
ui
(
b
⌊i⌋
2
)]
≥
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈Gi
(
1−
1
α
)
⌊γ · qij⌋h
(
vij − pj
)
.
Similarly, for the fractional part of the γ-boosting deviation we get:
∑
i∈I
∑
j
vij · qij ≥
∑
i∈I
Eb-i∼s-i
[
ui
(
b
{i}
2
)]
≥
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈Gi
(
1−
1
α
)
{γ · qij}h
(
vij − pj
)
.
Together these two deviations give us
2
∑
i∈I
∑
j
vij · qij ≥
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈Gi
(
1−
1
α
)
γ · qij
(
vij − pj
)
. (4)
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We further estimate the term
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈Gi
(
vij − pj
)
· qij on the RHS of Equation (4):∑
i∈I
∑
j∈Gi
(
vij − pj
)
· qij =
∑
i∈I
∑
j
vij · qij −
∑
i∈I
∑
j 6∈Gi
vij · qij −
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈Gi
pj · qij
≥
∑
i∈I
∑
j
vij · qij −
∑
i∈I
∑
j 6∈Ji
pj · qij −
∑
i∈I
∑
j 6∈Γi
vij · qij −
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈Gi
pj · qij
≥
∑
i∈I
∑
j
vij · qij −
∑
i∈I
∑
j 6∈Γi
vij · qij −
∑
j
pj
∑
i∈I
qij
≥
∑
i∈I
∑
j
vij · qij −
∑
i∈I
∑
j 6∈Γi
vij · qij − α · REV(s), (5)
where the first inequality holds as
∑
j 6∈Gi
vijqij ≤
∑
j 6∈Ji
vijqij +
∑
j 6∈Γi
vijqij and vij < pj for every
j /∈ Ji. Our next goal will be to bound the term
∑
i∈I
∑
j 6∈Γi
vij · qij on the RHS of Equation (5).
Before that we need to do some preparations. To ease the notations we denote by j{ℓ} the ℓth share
of item j. We observe that the expected Liquid Welfare at equilibrium is at least
LW(s) =
∑
i
Prb∼s [vi(xi) > Bi] ·Bi +
∑
i
∑
j
h∑
ℓ=1
Prb∼s
[
{vi(xi) ≤ Bi} ∧ {i wins j
{ℓ}}
]
·
vij
h
=
∑
i
Qi ·Bi +
∑
i,j
vij
(
1
h
h∑
ℓ=1
Pr
[
i wins j{ℓ}
]
−
1
h
h∑
ℓ=1
Pr
[
{vi(xi) > Bi} ∧ {i wins j
{ℓ}}
])
=
∑
i
Qi ·Bi +
∑
i,j
vij ·max
{
0 , qij −
1
h
h∑
ℓ=1
Pr
[
{vi(xi) > Bi} ∧ {i wins j
{ℓ}}
]}
≥
∑
i
Qi ·Bi +
∑
i,j
vij ·max {0, qij −Pr [vi(xi) > Bi]}
=
∑
i
Qi ·Bi +
∑
i,j
max {0, qij −Qi} · vij ≥
∑
i∈I3
1
2γ
·Bi +
∑
i∈I
∑
j 6∈Γi
vij ·
qij
2
, (6)
where the third equality holds true as the expression inside the max cannot be negative and
qij =
1
h
∑h
ℓ=1Pr[i wins j
{ℓ}] by definition of qij, the first inequality holds since Pr[vi(xi) >
Bi] ≥ Pr[{vi(xi) > Bi} ∧ {i wins j
{ℓ}}], the last equality holds true by definition of Qi, and
the last inequality holds since players i ∈ I3 have Qi >
1
2γ , while for players i ∈ I ⊆ I3 and
items j 6∈ Γi we have Qi ≤
1
2 ·
1
γ
≤
qij
2 . Now we rearrange terms from Equation (6) to get∑
i∈I
∑
j 6∈Γi
vijqij ≤ 2 · LW(s) −
1
γ
∑
i∈I3
Bi. Combining Equation (4) and Equation (5), we can
substitute this upper bound to get:
2
∑
i∈I
∑
j
vij · qij ≥
(
1−
1
α
)
γ

∑
i∈I
∑
j
vij · qij − α · REV(s)− 2 · LW(s) +
1
γ
∑
i∈I3
Bi

 .
Dividing both sides by
(
1− 1
α
)
γ and rearranging terms gives the lemma:(
1−
2α
γ(α− 1)
)∑
i∈I
∑
j
vij · qij ≤ α ·REV(s) + 2 · LW(s)−
1
γ
∑
i∈I3
Bi.
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Now we have all necessary components to conclude the proof of Theorem 1 and show that the
Liquid Price of Anarchy of any mixed Nash equilibrium is bounded.
Proof of Theorem 1. We combine the bounds from Lemma 3.1 and Lemma 3.2 and obtain
α ·REV(s) + 2 · LW(s)−
1
γ
∑
i∈I3
Bi ≥
(
1−
2α
γ(α− 1)
)(
1
2
−
1
2α
)OPT− α(1 + γ + n
h
)
REV(s)−
∑
i∈I3
Bi

 .
Since LW(s) ≥ REV(s) we further derive that(
α+ 2 +
1
2
(
1−
1
α
−
2
γ
)
α
(
1 + γ +
n
h
))
LW(s) ≥
1
2
(
1−
1
α
−
2
γ
)
OPT+
(
1
γ
−
1
2
(
1−
1
α
−
2
γ
))∑
i∈I3
Bi.
As long as the factor in front of
∑
i∈I3
Bi is nonnegative, we have OPT ≤ O
(
n
h
)
· LW(s) for
any 1 ≤ h ≤ n for a particular choice of parameters (e.g., α = 2.26, γ = 7.16). In particular, when
h ≥ n, we have that the LPoA is at most 51.5.
Remark 1. The bound on the Liquid Price of Anarchy derived in Theorem 1 holds for simultaneous
first price auctions with the house clearing item bidding mechanism.
Proof. We observe that the bidding strategy defined in Claim 3.1 extends naturally to the new
house clearing mechanism. Moreover, for a new equilibrium s with appropriately redefined item
prices p(s), the argument from the proof of Claim 3.1 gives us exactly the same guarantee on
the expected number of shares won by a bidder. Indeed, in the new mechanism when a bidder
faces competitors’ bids or equivalently the set of share prices {pℓj}
h
ℓ=1, they avoid the uncertainty
of bidding on all shares ℓ with high prices
pj
h
< pℓj and thus they receive at least as many copies as
they would get in the independent share bidding auction.
We further note that all the remaining parts of the proof of Theorem 1 do not depend on the
market clearing format of first price item bidding auctions.
4 Pure Nash Equilibria
We also study pure Nash equilibria of simultaneous first price auctions with deterministic tie-
breaking rules. The proofs of the next two theorems are given in Appendices B and C, respectively.
Theorem 2. Consider a simultaneous first price auction where budgeted bidders have fractionally-
subadditive valuations3. If b is a pure Nash equilibrium, then LW(b) ≥ OPT2 .
A complementary tightness result for Theorem 2 is given in Appendix E.
Unfortunately, this result is not quite satisfying compared to mixed Nash equilibria. The first
reason is that pure Nash equilibria might not even exist. Consider the following auction with n = 2
3Valuation v is fractionally-subadditive or equivalently XOS if there is a set of additive valuations A = {a1, . . . , aℓ}
such that vi(S) = maxa∈A a(S) for every S ⊆ [m]. XOS is a super class of submodular and additive valuations.
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players and m = 10 identical items, where player 1 values each item at 1 and has a budget of 1,
while the second player values each item at 1.1, and has a budget of 1.1. It is easy to see that
there can be no pure Nash equilibrium, for the following reason. If player 2 knows what player
1 is bidding, player 2 has the budget to simply outbid player 1 and win all items. On the other
hand, if player 2 is winning all items, one of their bids must be at most 0.11 (due to their budget
constraint), and therefore player 1 can outbid player 2 on this item. Hence, there is no pure Nash
equilibrium. Moreover, it holds true for both simultaneous first price and second price auctions.
Second, the LPoA guarantees strongly depend on the tie-breaking rules used in the auction. In
particular, if we allow randomized tie-breaking rules, the LPoA is no longer a constant.
Theorem 3. With a randomized tie-breaking rule, there are simultaneous first and second price
auction games which have an Ω(n) Liquid Price of Anarchy, even when agents play pure strategies.
Lower Bound: Divisible Items. In order to reconcile this big gap between the Liquid Welfare
of the optimal allocation and pure equilibria with randomized tie-breaking rules (and mixed Nash
equilibria in general), we considered in Section 3 a share model in which each item j is divided
into h identical shares and obtained an upper bound of O
(
1 + n
h
)
on the LPoA. We now show a
complementary lower bound that the Liquid Price of Anarchy is super constant for such equilibria
when the number of shares is h = o(n). The proof of Theorem 4 is deferred to Appendix C.
Theorem 4. There are some simultaneous first price and second price auction games for which
the Liquid Price of Anarchy is Ω
(
n
h
)
when the number of shares is h.
5 Extensions
Remark 1. The bound on the Liquid Price of Anarchy derived in Theorem 1 holds for simultaneous
first price auctions with the house clearing item bidding mechanism.
The result of Theorem 1 also extends to Bayesian first price auctions and very similar results
hold true for the second price auction format, under standard necessary restrictions on the bidding
strategy of the buyers (we describe and discuss these restrictions in Appendix A). The formal proof
of Theorem 5 is given in Appendix D and closely follows the proof of Theorem 1.
Theorem 5. In simultaneous first price auctions with n additive bidders and budgets, where ev-
ery item has h equal shares (copies), the Liquid Price of Anarchy of Bayesian Nash equilibria is
O
(
1 + n
h
)
(at most 51.5, when h ≥ n).
Theorem 6. In simultaneous second price auctions with n additive bidders and budgets, where
every item has h equal shares (copies), the Liquid Price of Anarchy of Bayesian Nash equilibria is
O
(
1 + n
h
)
(at most 51.5, when h ≥ n), under the no over-bidding and no over-budgeting assump-
tions.
Proof. The proof that Bayesian Nash equilibria achieve a good Liquid Price of Anarchy for si-
multaneous second price auctions follows similarly to the proof of Theorem 5 in Appendix D. In
the following we only discuss the differences that are related to the second price format. In first
price simultaneous auctions we have REV(s) = 1
α
∑m
j=1 pj , while in the second price auction each
bidder pays less than 1
α
pj per item j. However, the proof for simultaneous second price auctions
goes through if we substitute REV(s) with the sum of prices 1
α
∑m
j=1 pj , for the reason that the
property 1
α
∑m
j=1 pj ≤ LW(s) still holds. To see why, fix a pure bidding profile b = (b1, . . . , bn) of
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the players. Recall that j{ℓ} denotes the ℓth share of item j, and that xi(b) denotes the set of shares
of items that player i wins when players bid according to b. In particular, the no over-bidding and
no over-budgeting assumptions (see Appendix A for the definitions of these assumptions) imply∑
j{ℓ}∈xi(b)
bℓij ≤ vi(xi(b)) and
∑
j{ℓ}∈xi(b)
bℓij ≤ Bi. Hence, similarly to the simultaneous first price
auction setting, we get:
REV(s) =
1
α
m∑
j=1
pj =
m∑
j=1
h∑
ℓ=1
E
[
pℓj
]
=
m∑
j=1
h∑
ℓ=1
E
[
max
i
bℓij
]
=
n∑
i=1
E

 ∑
j{ℓ}∈xi(b)
bℓij

 ≤ n∑
i=1
E [min{vi(xi(b)), Bi}] = LW(s),
where the expectation is taken over players’ valuation profiles and randomized bidding strategies.
The last observation we mention is that the utility a player receives when performing a deviation
in simultaneous second price auctions is at least as high as the utility they would receive if they were
forced to pay their bid (since players pay the second highest bid). Thus, all inequalities involving
the utility each player derives when performing a deviation still hold. It is not hard to verify that
the rest of the proof goes through as well.
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A Second Price Auctions.
We also study simultaneous second price auctions, where each item j again is allocated to the
highest bidder, but the winner pays the second highest bid on item j. The total payment of bidder
ℓ in this case is pℓ(b) =
∑
j∈xi(b)
maxi 6=ℓ bij. As before one can study the Liquid Price of Anarchy
for the second price format. However, in general, the Price of Anarchy of second price auctions
can be arbitrarily large even when bidders do not have budget constraints and there is only one
item for sale4. To prevent such pathological equilibria, it is standard [6, 14, 21] to assume that
each bidder is guaranteed to derive non-negative utility, no matter how the other bidders behave,
i.e.,
∑
j∈S bij ≤ vi(S) ∀S ⊆ [m]. In other words, no bidder would want to “overbid” on any set
of items. In the budgeted setting, in addition to this no over-bidding assumption, we also require
that
∑
j∈[m] bij ≤ Bi (i.e., no over-budgeting). The latter is a necessary assumption even in the
single-item case to exclude pathological equilibria. The no over-budgeting assumption can also be
motivated by risk-averse attitudes of buyers, who try to eliminate any chance of exceeding their
budget and deriving infinite disutility.
B Pure Nash Equilibria: Beyond Additive Valuations
In this section we consider buyers with complex combinatorial valuations and study the efficiency
of pure Nash equilibria of simultaneous item bidding auctions for bidders with budgets. We first
show that the Liquid Price of Anarchy for second price auctions, in which bidders have fractionally-
subadditive valuations, is 2. The proof is inspired by [14]. We recall the definition of fractionally-
subadditive valuations.
Definition 5. Valuation vi is fractionally-subadditive if there is a set of additive valuations A =
{a1, . . . , aℓ} (for some ℓ ≥ 0) such that vi(S) = maxa∈A a(S) for every S ⊆ [m].
Valuation a ∈ A is called a maximizing additive valuation for a particular set S if vi(S) = a(S).
Theorem B.1. Consider a simultaneous second price auction in which bidders have fractionally-
subadditive valuations. If b is a pure Nash equilibrium where players’ bids satisfy no over-bidding
and no over-budgeting, then we have LW(b) ≥ OPT2 .
Proof. We begin with the following useful lemma.
Lemma B.1. Fix an arbitrary S ⊆ [m] and a player i such that vi(S) > 0, and let ar be a
maximizing additive valuation for S. Consider the alternative bidding strategy b∗i for i, where
b∗ij = ar({j})
min{vi(S),Bi}
vi(S)
for j ∈ S and b∗ij = 0 for j 6∈ S. Then for any pure profile b-i we have:
ui(b
∗
i ,b-i) ≥ min{vi(S), Bi} −
∑
j∈S
max
k 6=i
bkj.
Proof. Let T be the set of items that player i wins in the allocation xi(b
∗
i ,b-i). Note that
maxk 6=i bkj = 0 for any j ∈ T \ S and b
∗
ij − maxk 6=i bkj = ar({j})
min{vi(S),Bi}
vi(S)
− maxk 6=i bkj ≤ 0
4A canonical example is two bidders who value the item at 0 and a large number L, respectively, but the first
bidder bids L+ 1 and the second bidder bids 0.
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for any j ∈ S \ T . Then, we have:
ui(b
∗
i ,b-i) = vi(T )−
∑
j∈T
max
k 6=i
bkj ≥
∑
j∈T∩S
ar({j}) −
∑
j∈T∩S
max
k 6=i
bkj
≥
∑
j∈T∩S
ar({j})
min{vi(S), Bi}
vi(S)
−
∑
j∈T∩S
max
k 6=i
bkj
≥
∑
j∈S
ar({j})
min{vi(S), Bi}
vi(S)
−
∑
j∈S
max
k 6=i
bkj
= min{vi(S), Bi} −
∑
j∈S
max
k 6=i
bkj.
Let v1, . . . , vn denote the valuations of the players, and fix a particular player i. Let OPT
denote the value of the optimal solution, and let S∗i denote the set of items that player i receives
in an optimal allocation and Si = xi(b) be i’s allocation in the pure Nash equilibrium. Suppose
that vi(S
∗
i ) > 0 (we will handle the case that vi(S
∗
i ) = 0 separately). Let ar be the maximizing
additive valuation for the set S∗i , and consider the following deviating strategy for player i: b
∗
ij =
ar({j})
min{vi(S
∗
i ),Bi}
vi(S∗i )
for j ∈ S∗i and b
∗
ij = 0 for j 6∈ S
∗
i . Notice that the alternative strategy b
∗
i
satisfies no over-bidding and no over-budgeting.
Then, by Lemma B.1, we have ui(b
∗
i ,b-i) ≥ min{vi(S
∗
i ), Bi} −
∑
j∈S∗i
maxk 6=i bkj. Since b is a
pure Nash equilibrium, the following must hold:
vi(Si) ≥ ui(bi,b-i) ≥ ui(b
∗
i ,b-i) ≥ min{vi(S
∗
i ), Bi} −
∑
j∈S∗i
max
k 6=i
bkj.
Hence, if vi(S
∗
i ) > 0 and vi(Si) ≤ Bi, then we have shown that min{vi(Si), Bi} = vi(Si) ≥
min{vi(S
∗
i ), Bi}−
∑
j∈S∗i
maxk 6=i bkj. Now, consider a player i such that vi(S
∗
i ) = 0 and vi(Si) ≤ Bi.
Then again we have min{vi(Si), Bi} ≥ min{vi(S
∗
i ), Bi} ≥ min{vi(S
∗
i ), Bi} −
∑
j∈S∗i
maxk 6=i bkj.
Finally, consider a player i such that vi(Si) > Bi. In such a case, we have min{vi(Si), Bi} = Bi ≥
min{vi(S
∗
i ), Bi} ≥ min{vi(S
∗
i ), Bi} −
∑
j∈S∗i
maxk 6=i bkj. Hence, in each case, we have the same
lower bound on min{vi(Si), Bi}. Putting these together and summing over all bidders, we get:
LW(b) =
n∑
i=1
min{vi(Si), Bi} ≥
n∑
i=1
min{vi(S
∗
i ), Bi} −
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈S∗i
max
k 6=i
bkj
≥ OPT−
m∑
j=1
max
k
bkj
= OPT−
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈Si
bij
≥ OPT−
n∑
i=1
min{vi(Si), Bi} = OPT− LW(b),
where the last inequality follows since b satisfies no over-bidding (i.e.,
∑
j∈Si
bij ≤ vi(Si)) and no
over-budgeting (i.e.,
∑
j∈Si
bij ≤ Bi).
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Similarly, the Liquid Price of Anarchy for pure Nash equilibria of simultaneous first-price auc-
tions, in which bidders have fractionally-subadditive valuations, is arbitrarily close to 2.
Theorem B.2 (Theorem 2). Consider a simultaneous first price auction where bidders have
fractionally-subadditive valuations. If b is a pure Nash equilibrium, then for any ǫ > 0 we have
LW(b) ≥ OPT2 − ǫ.
Proof. We begin with the following statement, which is similar to Lemma B.1.
Lemma B.2. Fix an arbitrary S ⊆ [m] and a player i such that vi(S) > 0, and let ar be a
maximizing additive valuation for S. For any δ > 0, consider the alternative bidding strategy b∗i for
i, where b∗ij = min{ar({j})
min{vi(S),Bi}
vi(S)
,maxk 6=i bkj + δ} for j ∈ S and b
∗
ij = 0 for j 6∈ S. Then for
any pure profile b
-i we have:
ui(b
∗
i ,b-i) ≥ min{vi(S), Bi} −
∑
j∈S
max
k 6=i
bkj − δ|S|.
Proof. Let T be the set of items that player i wins in the allocation xi(b
∗
i ,b-i). Note that for any
j ∈ T \ S, we have b∗ij = 0 and for any j ∈ T ∩ S, we have b
∗
ij ≤ maxk 6=i bkj + δ. Moreover,
b∗ij −maxk 6=i bkj ≤ 0 and b
∗
ij = ar({j})
min{vi(S),Bi}
vi(S)
for any j ∈ S \ T . Then, we have:
ui(b
∗
i ,b-i) = vi(T )−
∑
j∈T
b∗ij ≥
∑
j∈T∩S
ar({j}) −
∑
j∈T∩S
max
k 6=i
bkj − δ|T ∩ S|
≥
∑
j∈T∩S
ar({j})
min{vi(S), Bi}
vi(S)
−
∑
j∈T∩S
max
k 6=i
bkj − δ|S|
≥
∑
j∈S
ar({j})
min{vi(S), Bi}
vi(S)
−
∑
j∈S
max
k 6=i
bkj − δ|S|
= min{vi(S), Bi} −
∑
j∈S
max
k 6=i
bkj − δ|S|.
Let v1, . . . , vn denote the valuations of the players, and fix a particular player i. Let OPT
denote the value of the optimal solution, and let S∗i denote the set of items that player i receives in
an optimal allocation and Si = xi(b) be i’s allocation in the pure Nash equilibrium. Suppose that
vi(S
∗
i ) > 0 (we will handle the case that vi(S
∗
i ) = 0 separately). Let ar be the maximizing additive
valuation for the set S∗i , and consider the following deviating strategy for player i for some δ > 0
to be set later: b∗ij = min{ar({j})
min{vi(S),Bi}
vi(S)
,maxk 6=i bkj + δ} for j ∈ S
∗
i and b
∗
ij = 0 for j 6∈ S
∗
i .
Notice that the alternative strategy b∗i satisfies no over-budgeting.
Then, by Lemma B.2, we have ui(b
∗
i ,b-i) ≥ min{vi(S
∗
i ), Bi} −
∑
j∈S∗i
maxk 6=i bkj − δ|S
∗
i |. Since
b is a pure Nash equilibrium, the following must hold:
vi(Si) ≥ ui(bi,b-i) ≥ ui(b
∗
i ,b-i) ≥ min{vi(S
∗
i ), Bi} −
∑
j∈S∗i
max
k 6=i
bkj − δ|S
∗
i |.
Hence, if vi(S
∗
i ) > 0 and vi(Si) ≤ Bi, then we have shown that min{vi(Si), Bi} = vi(Si) ≥
min{vi(S
∗
i ), Bi} −
∑
j∈S∗i
maxk 6=i bkj − δ|S
∗
i |. Now, consider a player i such that vi(S
∗
i ) = 0
and vi(Si) ≤ Bi. Then again we have min{vi(Si), Bi} ≥ min{vi(S
∗
i ), Bi} ≥ min{vi(S
∗
i ), Bi} −
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∑
j∈S∗i
maxk 6=i bkj − δ|S
∗
i |. Finally, consider a player i such that vi(Si) > Bi. In such a case,
we have min{vi(Si), Bi} = Bi ≥ min{vi(S
∗
i ), Bi} ≥ min{vi(S
∗
i ), Bi} −
∑
j∈S∗i
maxk 6=i bkj − δ|S
∗
i |.
Hence, in each case, we have the same lower bound on min{vi(Si), Bi}. Putting these together and
summing over all bidders, we get:
LW(b) =
n∑
i=1
min{vi(Si), Bi} ≥
n∑
i=1
min{vi(S
∗
i ), Bi} −
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈S∗i
max
k 6=i
bkj − δ
n∑
i=1
|S∗i |
≥ OPT−
m∑
j=1
max
k
bkj − δm
= OPT−
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈Si
bij − δm
≥ OPT−
n∑
i=1
min{vi(Si), Bi} − δm = OPT− LW(b)− δm,
where the last inequality follows since in any Nash equilibrium, the bids b must satisfy
∑
j∈Si
bij ≤
vi(Si) and
∑
j∈Si
bij ≤ Bi. Noting that we can set δ =
2ǫ
m
gives the theorem.
C Lower Bounds
We give an example with additive valuations which shows that a randomized tie-breaking rule can
lead to a Liquid Price of Anarchy which is Ω(n) in the following theorem.
Theorem C.1 (Theorem 3). With a randomized tie-breaking rule, there are simultaneous first and
second price auction games which have an Ω(n) Liquid Price of Anarchy, even when agents play
pure strategies.
Proof. Consider a simultaneous first price auction in which there are n items and n bidders (the
proof goes through for simultaneous second price auctions as well). Each bidder has the same
valuation profile for the items, namely they all value the first item at n4 and the remaining n − 1
items at 1. Moreover, each bidder has a budget of 1. Observe that the optimal solution is n, which
is attained by giving each agent one item, for a total Liquid Welfare of n (since each player is
budget-capped at 1).
On the other hand, consider the following randomized tie-breaking rule, where all ties among
the highest bids that occur for item 1 are broken uniformly at random (the tie-breaking rule for
the remaining items can be arbitrary). Since item 1 is valued so highly, the pure strategy profile in
which each bidder bids 1 (i.e., their maximum possible bid) for item 1 is a pure Nash equilibrium.
In particular, each player wins item 1 with probability 1
n
, and since all n agents are tied for the
maximum bid, their utility is 1
n
· (n4 − 1). If they switch, their utility will be at most n − 1 (the
same holds for second price auctions). This leads to a Liquid Welfare of 1, which implies the Liquid
Price of Anarchy is Ω(n).
In fact, the same problem also exists when the tie-breaking rule is deterministic and players can
randomize their strategies.
Theorem C.2. With a deterministic tie-breaking rule, there are some simultaneous first price and
second price auction games for which the Liquid Price of Anarchy is Ω(n) when agents mix their
strategies.
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Proof. Consider a simultaneous first price auction in which there are n items and n bidders (the
proof goes through for simultaneous second price auctions as well), each of which has a budget of
1. Items 1 and 2 have a tie-breaking rule which favors players lexicographically (i.e., player 1 is the
most preferred while player n is the least preferred), while the rest of the items have an arbitrary
tie-breaking rule. All players value the first two items at 22n. The first n − 2 players value the
remaining items 3, . . . , n at 1, while players n − 1 and n value items 3, . . . , n at 0. Observe that
the optimal solution is n, which is attained by allocating item 1 to player n − 1, item 2 to player
n, and giving each of the remaining n− 2 items to each of the remaining n− 2 players.
Consider the following bad mixed Nash equilibrium. Players n and n − 2 have pure strategies
where both of them bid their full budget on item 1 (recall all players have a budget of 1). Players
n− 1 and n− 3 have pure strategies where both of them bid their full budget on item 2. The first
n − 4 players randomize their strategies by bidding their full budget on item 1 with probability 12
and bidding their full budget on item 2 with probability 12 . This leads to a Liquid Welfare of 2,
since only two players win an item. Hence, the Liquid Price of Anarchy is Ω(n).
Let us see why this mixed strategy profile forms an equilibrium. Players n− 1 and n never win
an item since the tie-breaking rule prefers player n − 3 to player n − 1 and prefers player n − 2
to player n, but they cannot deviate and improve their utility. In particular, both players value
items n − 3, . . . , n at 0, so they cannot bid on such items. Moreover, even if player n deviates
and bids their full budget on item 2, they still lose since the tie-breaking rule prefers player n− 3
(similarly, player n − 1 cannot improve their utility by deviating to item 1 since the tie-breaking
rule prefers player n−2). Player n−2 currently wins exactly when players 1, . . . , n−4 all randomly
choose item 2, which happens with probability 1
2n−4
, and hence has an expected utility of at least
1
2n−4
(22n − 1) ≥ 2n (similarly, player n − 3 wins when players 1, . . . , n − 4 all choose item 1, and
hence player n− 3 has the same expected utility as player n− 2). Consider any other possible pure
strategy for player n − 2. They cannot win item 1 since they bid strictly less than 1, and they
cannot win item 2 since player n− 3 is preferred by the tie-breaking rule. Their expected utility in
any such deviation is at most n− 2 < 2n, which is attained by winning each of the items valued at
1. A similar argument holds for player n− 3, the only difference being that if they deviate and bid
their whole budget on item 1, they can win the item (but this results in the same expected utility).
Finally, observe that each player i > n−3 wins an item of value 22n when all players 1, . . . , i−1 bid
on the other item of value 22n, and hence player i’s expected utility is at least 2n. Any deviation
will result in the same expected utility, or an expected utility of at most n − 2. Hence, we have a
mixed Nash equilibrium.
In the following theorems, we consider the affect of shares on the Liquid Price of Anarchy. We
write the proofs assuming the market clearing mechanism for shares discussed in Section 3, but the
proofs can easily be extended to handle the share model where shares are treated as separate items
and buyers can submit different bids for every single share.
Theorem C.3. With a randomized tie-breaking rule, there are some simultaneous first price and
second price auction games for which the Liquid Price of Anarchy is Ω
(
n
h
)
when the number of
shares is h, even when agents play pure strategies.
Proof. We proceed in a manner similar to the proof of Theorem 3. In particular, we again consider
a simultaneous first price auction in which there are n items and n bidders, where each of the items
has h shares. Each bidder has the same valuation profile for the items, namely they all value the
first item at n4, and hence extract a value of n
4
h
per share, while the remaining n − 1 items are
valued at 1, each share of which has value 1
h
. Moreover, each bidder has a budget of 1 as before.
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Observe that the optimal solution is n, which is attained by giving each agent every share of a
particular item, for a total Liquid Welfare of n (since each player is budget-capped at 1).
On the other hand, consider the following randomized tie-breaking rule, where all ties among the
highest bids that occur for each share of item 1 are broken uniformly at random (the tie-breaking
rule for the remaining shares can be arbitrary). Since item 1 is valued so highly, the pure strategy
profile in which each bidder wants 1 share of the first item and bids 1 per share (i.e., their maximum
possible bid) is a pure Nash equilibrium. In particular, each player wins one share of item 1 with
probability h
n
, and since all n agents are tied for the maximum bid, their utility is h
n
· (n
4
h
− 1). If
they switch, their utility will be at most n − 1 (the same holds for second price auctions). Notice
that no player would ever bid on multiple shares of the first item, since this would mean they are
bidding strictly less than one per share and never win a share. This leads to a Liquid Welfare of
at most h, which implies the Liquid Price of Anarchy is at least n
h
.
In fact, we can obtain a similar negative result when players can mix their strategies, even when
the tie-breaking rule is deterministic. As mentioned earlier, the proof is written in the context of
the market clearing mechanism for shares, but can easily be extended to the case where shares are
treated as separate items and players can submit different bids for each share.
Theorem C.4 (Theorem 4). With a deterministic tie-breaking rule, there are some simultaneous
first price and second price auction games for which the Liquid Price of Anarchy is Ω
(
n
h
)
when the
number of shares is h and agents mix their strategies.
Proof. We proceed in a manner similar to the proof of Theorem C.2, but adapt the example for
the share model. Consider a simultaneous first price auction in which there are n items, each with
h shares, and n bidders, each with a budget of 1 (the proof goes through for simultaneous second
price auctions as well). Items 1 and 2 have a tie-breaking rule which favors players lexicographically
(i.e., player 1 is the most preferred while player n is the least preferred), while the rest of the items
have an arbitrary tie-breaking rule. All players value the first two items at 22n, each share of which
is valued at 2
2n
h
. The first n − 2 players value the remaining items 3, . . . , n at 1, each share of
which is valued at 1
h
, while players n− 1 and n value items 3, . . . , n at 0. Observe that the optimal
solution is n, which is attained by allocating item 1 to player n− 1, item 2 to player n, and giving
each of the remaining n− 2 items to each of the remaining n− 2 players (here, giving an item to a
player means giving all shares of the item to the player).
Consider the following bad mixed Nash equilibrium. Players n, n − 2, . . . , n − 2 · h have pure
strategies where all h + 1 of them bid their full budget on one share of item 1 (recall all players
have a budget of 1). Players n − 1, n − 3, . . . , n − 2 · h − 1 have pure strategies where all h+ 1 of
them bid their full budget on one share of item 2. The first n − 2 · h − 2 players randomize their
strategies by bidding their full budget on one share of item 1 with probability 12 and bidding their
full budget on one share of item 2 with probability 12 . This leads to a Liquid Welfare of 2 · h, since
only 2 · h players win a share. Hence, the Liquid Price of Anarchy is Ω
(
n
h
)
.
Let us see why this mixed strategy profile forms an equilibrium. Observe that, no matter how
the first n− 2 · h− 2 players randomly choose which item to bid on, there are always at least h+1
players bidding on item 1 and at least h + 1 players bidding on item 2. Hence, player n never
wins a share since the tie-breaking rule prefers all other h agents that purely bid on item 1, and
similarly player n−1 never wins a share since the tie-breaking rule prefers all other h agents playing
purely on item 2. These two players cannot deviate and improve their utility, since they value items
3, . . . , n at 0 and hence cannot bid on such items. Moreover, even if player n deviates and bids
their full budget on one share of item 2, they still lose due to the tie-breaking rule (similarly, player
n− 1 cannot improve their utility by deviating to item 1 due to the tie-breaking rule). In addition,
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player n is indifferent between bidding 1 on item 1 and bidding less than 1, since their utility is 0
either way (similarly, player n− 1 is indifferent between bidding 1 on item 2 and bidding less than
1). In fact, every player who bids less than 1 on item 1 or less than one on item 2 loses the item
with certainty.
Consider any other player n − 2 · i purely bidding on item 1 (so 1 ≤ i ≤ h). There are h − i
players who also purely bid on item 1 and are preferred by the tie-breaking rule, but if player
n−2 · i deviates and purely bids their full budget on one share of item 2, the probability of winning
a share decreases since there are h − i + 1 players who purely bid on item 2 and are preferred by
the tie-breaking rule. If player n− 2 · i bids less than 1 on item 1 and less than 1 on item 2, then
their utility is at most n − 2 (attained by winning all shares of items 3, . . . , n). However, in the
Nash equilibrium, the probability that player n−2 · i wins a share is at least the probability that all
players who mix their strategies randomly choose item 2, which is given by 1
2n−2h−2
. Hence, their
expected utility is at least 1
2n−2h−2
(
22n
h
− 1
)
≥ 2n ≥ n− 2, so they cannot improve their expected
utility by deviating. The argument that players purely bidding on item 2 cannot improve their
expected utility by deviating is similar. The only difference is that, for any such player n− 2 · i− 1
for 1 ≤ i ≤ h, the number of players that purely bid on item 2 and are preferred by the tie-breaking
rule is h− i, which also holds if player n−2 · i−1 were to purely bid on item 1. Hence, such players
would win a share of item 1 after deviating with the same probability of winning a share in the
mixed Nash equilibrium, so they are indifferent. Finally, observe that each player i ≥ n− 2h− 2 is
indifferent between item 1 and item 2, and they have an expected utility at least that of any player
who bids purely and wins a share with positive probability, which is at least 2n. This is at least as
much as their expected utility in any deviation, and hence we have a mixed Nash equilibrium.
D Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
We assume agents have additive valuations and submit bids on shares, and if they receive an xij
fraction of shares of item j, then their value is given by vi(xij) = vij · xij (vi is technically defined
over sets, but for singleton sets we will often write vij for ease of notation). We consider a Bayesian
setting, where the bidders’ valuations are drawn independently from distributions D1, . . . ,Dn and
write D = D1 × · · · × Dn, so that v is drawn from D. We assume that each valuation vi is realized
together with an associated budget Bi which we usually will omit in our notations for brevity. In
fact, we will use the notation Bi(vi) to emphasize that each player’s budget can be correlated with
their valuation. We think of D as being public knowledge, whereas the realization vi is known only
to agent i.
We further assume that the buyers bid according to a Bayesian Nash equilibrium b ∼ s(v),
where v ∼ D. When buyers bid in simultaneous auctions, this induces a distribution of prices over
all shares of items p ∼ F from a distribution F (e.g., winning bids in first price auctions, namely
pℓj = maxi b
ℓ
ij where b
ℓ
ij is player i’s bid for share ℓ of item j). In particular, for all items we can
define an “expected price per item” at equilibrium or just a “price per item” as p = (p1, . . . , pm),
where pj = α
∑h
ℓ=1 EF [p
ℓ
j], for some α > 1 (α = 2 will be sufficient for us). This induces a natural
“expected price per share,” namely
pj
h
. One simple observation about p is the following:
Observation D.1. Revenue is related to prices: REV(s) = 1
α
∑m
j=1 pj, where REV(s) denotes the
expected revenue at the equilibrium profile s.
We next show that if players bid on some fraction of shares of item j uniformly at random
according to pj , then they win a large number of shares in expectation.
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Claim D.1. For any item j, if a player bids on a δ-fraction of shares chosen uniformly at random
of item j at a given price
pj
h
per share, then the player receives in expectation at least h · δ ·
(
1− 1
α
)
shares of the item (i.e., at least a δ ·
(
1− 1
α
)
-fraction of item j).
Proof. Suppose towards a contradiction that the expected number of shares won by bidder i is less
than δ · h ·
(
1− 1
α
)
. In particular, it means that
δ · h ·
(
1−
1
α
)
>
h∑
ℓ=1
Pr [i bids on share ℓ] ·PrF
[
pℓj <
pj
h
]
≥
h∑
ℓ=1
δ ·PrF
[
pℓj <
pj
h
]
.
We further use the definition of pj and Markov’s inequality to obtain a contradiction as follows:
pj
α
=
h∑
ℓ=1
EF
[
pℓj
]
≥
h∑
ℓ=1
pj
h
·PrF
[
pℓj ≥
pj
h
]
=
h∑
ℓ=1
pj
h
(
1−PrF
[
pℓj <
pj
h
])
> pj −
pj
h
· h ·
(
1−
1
α
)
.
When relating prices to Liquid Welfare we notice that
Observation D.2. Revenue is bounded by the Liquid Welfare: REV(s) ≤ LW(s), where LW(s)
denotes the expected Liquid Welfare at the equilibrium profile s.
For each fixed profile v of additive valuations we consider the following fractional relaxation
(LP) of the allocation problem with the goal of optimizing Liquid Welfare:
Maximize
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
vijzij
Subject to
∑
j
vijzij ≤ Bi(vi) ∀i
∑
i
zij ≤ 1 ∀j
zij ≥ 0 ∀i, j
We denote by y(v) = (yij) the optimal solution to the above LP. Notice that the optimal fractional
solution for the Liquid Welfare would never benefit from allocating a set of items to a player such
that their value for the set exceeds their budget.
We slightly abuse notations by defining yij(vi)
def
= Ev-i∼D-i [yij(vi,v-i)] for each bidder i with fixed
valuation vi. We observe that the vector of allocations yi(vi) is budget feasible, i.e.,
∑
j vijyij(vi) ≤
Bi(vi), as it is an average of budget feasible allocations for the fixed valuation vi and budget Bi(vi).
Furthermore, solutions to this LP give an upper bound on the optimal Liquid Welfare OPT.
Observation D.3. The optimal fractional solution to LP is better than the optimal allocation:
n∑
i=1
Evi∼Di [
m∑
j=1
vij · yij(vi)] ≥ OPT.
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We now define some notation that will be useful in order to obtain our result. We let qij(v)
and qij(vi) be the expected fraction of shares that player i receives from item j at an equilibrium
strategy s for a fixed valuation profile v and v-i ∼ D-i, respectively. In addition, for each agent
i, we consider a set of high value items Ji(vi)
def
=
{
j | vij ≥ pj
}
. We further define Qi(v) to be
the probability that vi(xi) ≥ Bi(vi) at equilibrium for a fixed valuation profile v (recall that xi
denotes the random set that player i receives in the Bayesian Nash equilibrium). We similarly define
Qi(vi) = Ev-i [Qi(v)] for a fixed valuation vi. We also define three sets of bidders, the first two of
which are for budget feasibility reasons and the last of which is for bidders that often fall under
their budget in equilibrium (these sets need not be disjoint). In particular, for a fixed parameter
γ > 1 to be determined later, we define sets I1, I2, and I3:
I1(v)
def
=
{
i
∣∣∣ γ ∑
j∈Ji(vi)
pj · qij(vi) ≤ Bi(vi)
}
, I2(v)
def
=
{
i
∣∣∣ ∑
j∈[m]
pj
h
≤ Bi(vi)
}
, and
I3(v)
def
=
{
i
∣∣∣ Qi(vi) ≤ 1
2γ
}
.
Throughout our proof, we focus on bidders in the set I(v)
def
= I1(v)∩I2(v)∩I3(v). We define sets
I1(v)
def
= [n] \ I1(v), I2(v)
def
= [n] \ I2(v), I3(v)
def
= [n] \ I3(v), and I(v)
def
= [n] \ I(v). We note
that although the set I depends on the entire valuation profile v, whether i ∈ I(v) or i ∈ I(v) is
determined only by vi alone. To this end, we need to argue that bidders outside of the set I do
not contribute a lot to the Liquid Welfare at equilibrium s.
Claim D.2. The total budget of players in I is small: Ev[
∑
i∈I(v)Bi(vi)] < α ·
(
γ + n
h
)
·REV(s)+
Ev[
∑
i∈I3(v)
Bi(vi)].
Proof. We first consider agents in I1 and obtain
Ev

 ∑
i∈I1(v)
Bi(vi)

 < Ev

γ ∑
i∈I1(v)
∑
j∈Ji(vi)
pj · qij(vi)

 ≤ Ev

γ∑
i
∑
j∈Ji(vi)
pj · qij(vi)


≤ Ev

γ∑
j
pj
∑
i:j∈Ji(vi)
qij(v)

 ≤ γ∑
j
pj ≤ γ · α · REV(s),
where the second to last inequality follows from the fact that
∑
i qij(v) ≤ 1 since we have a valid
fractional allocation. Next, we consider agents in I2 and obtain
Ev

 ∑
i∈I2(v)
Bi(vi)

 < Ev

 ∑
i∈I2(v)
∑
j
pj
h

 ≤ n
h
∑
j
pj ≤
n
h
· α ·REV(s).
Combining these bounds for agents in I1 and I2 we have
Ev

 ∑
i∈I(v)
Bi(vi)

 ≤ Ev

 ∑
i∈I1(v)
Bi(vi) +
∑
i∈I2(v)
Bi(vi) +
∑
i∈I3(v)
Bi(vi)


≤ α ·
(
γ +
n
h
)
·REV(s) + Ev

 ∑
i∈I3(v)
Bi(vi)

 .
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To achieve our result, we consider two main ideas for player deviations in set I(v) (each idea
actually consists of two parts). The first idea is to use the fractional solution to the LP as guidance
to claim that players can extract a large amount of value relative to the optimal solution. However,
for players to deviate, we must first round the fractional solution y into an integral solution (here,
by integral, we mean a multiple of 1
h
since this represents the fraction of shares a player receives
out of h copies). Define the first LP deviation (integral part) to be b
⌊i⌋
1 = (b
′
i,b-i), where in b
′
i
buyer i bids on a random ⌊yij⌋h-fraction of each item j ∈ Ji(vi) with price pj (here, ⌊y⌋h =
⌊y·h⌋
h
).
Define the second LP deviation (fractional part) to be b
{i}
1 = (b
′
i,b-i), where in b
′
i buyer i bids on a
random {yij}h-fraction of each item j ∈ Ji(vi) with price pj (here, {y}h =
1
h
if y > 0, and {y}h = 0
otherwise). We note that both LP deviations b
⌊i⌋
1 and b
{i}
1 are feasible, since vij ≥ pj for every
j ∈ Ji(vi), and
∑
j vij · yij ≤ Bi(vi) as y is a solution to LP along with I(v) ⊆ I2(v). Moreover,
for any yij(v), we have ⌊yij(v)⌋h + {yij(v)}h ≥ yij(v).
Lemma D.1 (LP deviations). Buyers in I at equilibrium s derive large value:
Ev

 ∑
i∈I(v)
∑
j
vij · qij(vi)

 ≥ (1
2
−
1
2α
)OPT− α(1 + γ + n
h
)
REV(s)− Ev

 ∑
i∈I3(v)
Bi(vi)



 .
Proof. For the integral part of the LP deviation, since Eb∼s[vi(b)] ≥ Eb∼s[ui(b)] and s is a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium, we have:
Ev

 ∑
i∈I(v)
∑
j
vij · qij(vi)

 ≥∑
i
Evi
[
1[i∈I] (vi)Eb∼s(v) [ui(b)]
]
≥
∑
i
Evi
[
1[i∈I] (vi)Eb-i∼s-i(v-i)
[
ui
(
b
⌊i⌋
1
)]]
≥
∑
i
Evi

1[i∈I] (vi) ∑
j∈Ji(vi)
(
1−
1
α
)
· ⌊yij(vi)⌋h
(
vij − pj
) , (7)
where to derive the last inequality we use Claim D.1. Similarly, for the fractional part of the LP
deviation we have:
Ev

 ∑
i∈I(v)
∑
j
vij · qij(vi)

 ≥∑
i
Evi
[
1[i∈I] (vi)Eb∼s(v) [ui(b)]
]
≥
∑
i
Evi
[
1[i∈I] (vi)Eb-i∼s-i(v-i)
[
ui
(
b
⌊i⌋
1
)]]
≥
∑
i
Evi

1[i∈I] (vi) ∑
j∈Ji(vi)
(
1−
1
α
)
· {yij(vi)}h
(
vij − pj
) , (8)
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Combining Equation (7) and Equation (8) we get
2Ev

 ∑
i∈I(v)
∑
j
vij · qij(vi)

 ≥∑
i
Evi

1[i∈I] (vi) ∑
j∈Ji(vi)
(
1−
1
α
)
·
(
⌊yij(vi)⌋h + {yij(vi)}h
) (
vij − pj
)
≥
∑
i
Evi

1[i∈I] (vi) ∑
j∈Ji(vi)
(
1−
1
α
)
yij(vi)
(
vij − pj
)
=
(
1−
1
α
)Ev

 ∑
i∈I(v)
∑
j∈Ji(vi)
vij · yij(v)−
∑
i∈I(v)
∑
j∈Ji(vi)
pj · yij(v)



 .
(9)
We further estimate
Ev

 ∑
i∈I(v)
∑
j∈Ji(vi)
vij · yij(v)

 = Ev

∑
i,j
vij · yij(v) −
∑
i 6∈I(v)
∑
j
vij · yij(v) −
∑
i∈I(v)
∑
j 6∈Ji(vi)
vij · yij(v)


≥ Ev

∑
i,j
vij · yij(v) −
∑
i 6∈I(v)
Bi(vi)−
∑
i∈I(v)
∑
j 6∈Ji(vi)
pj · yij(v)

 ,
where in the last inequality we used the condition from the LP that
∑
j vij · yij(v) ≤ Bi(vi) and
that vij ≤ pj for each j 6∈ Ji(vi). We substitute the last estimate into Equation (9) and obtain a
lower bound on 2Ev[
∑
i∈I(v)
∑
j vij · qij(vi)]:
(
1−
1
α
)
Ev

∑
i,j
vij · yij(v) −
∑
i 6∈I(v)
Bi(vi)−
∑
i∈I(v)
∑
j 6∈Ji(vi)
pj · yij(v) −
∑
i∈I(v)
∑
j∈Ji(vi)
pj · yij(v)


=
(
1−
1
α
)
Ev

∑
i,j
vij · yij(v) −
∑
i∈I(v)
∑
j
pj · yij(v)−
∑
i 6∈I(v)
Bi(vi)


≥
(
1−
1
α
)OPT− α(1 + γ + n
h
)
REV(s)− Ev

 ∑
i∈I3(v)
Bi(vi)



 ,
where the last inequality follows from the LP constraint that
∑
i yij(v) ≤ 1 for each j, the obser-
vation
∑
j pj = α ·REV(s), and Claim D.2.
We now turn to our second type of deviation, but we need to further restrict the set of items that
players bid on. In particular, we let Γi(vi) =
{
j
∣∣∣ qij(vi) ≤ 1γ}, and define Gi(vi) = Ji(vi)∩Γi(vi).
We now define the γ-boosting deviation (integral part) as b
⌊i⌋
2 = (b
′
i,b-i), where in b
′
i buyer i
bids on a random ⌊γ · qij(vi)⌋h-fraction of each item j ∈ Gi(vi) with price pj, where γ > 1 is a
constant to be determined later. Note that each b
⌊i⌋
2 deviation for every i ∈ I(v) is feasible since
I(v) ⊆ I1(v). Similarly, we define the fractional part of the γ-boosting deviation as b
{i}
2 , which is
also a feasible deviation since I(v) ⊆ I2(v). Also, since players bid on items in Gi(v) ⊆ Γi(v), we
have ⌊γ · qij(vi)⌋h ≤ 1 (we also have {γ · qij(vi)}h ≤ 1, which holds for all items by definition).
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Lemma D.2 (γ-boosting deviation). The value derived by buyers in I is comparable to the Liquid
Welfare obtained at equilibrium:
(
1−
2α
γ(α− 1)
)
Ev

 ∑
i∈I(v)
∑
j
vij · qij(vi)

 ≤ α ·REV(s) + 2 · LW(s)− 1
γ
Ev

 ∑
i∈I3(v)
Bi(vi)

 .
Proof. For the integral part of the γ-boosting deviation, we can now again obtain bounds via the
Bayesian Nash equilibrium condition and Claim D.1:
Ev

 ∑
i∈I(v)
∑
j
vij · qij(vi)

 ≥∑
i
Evi
[
1[i∈I] (vi)Eb∼s(v) [ui(b)]
]
≥
∑
i
Evi
[
1[i∈I] (vi)Eb-i∼s-i(v-i)
[
ui
(
b
⌊i⌋
2
)]]
≥
∑
i
Evi

1[i∈I] (vi) ∑
j∈Gi(vi)
(
1−
1
α
)
⌊γ · qij(vi)⌋h
(
vij − pj
) .
Similarly, for the fractional part of the γ-boosting deviation we get:
Ev

 ∑
i∈I(v)
∑
j
vij · qij(vi)

 ≥∑
i
Evi
[
1[i∈I] (vi)Eb-i∼s-i(v-i)
[
ui
(
b
⌊i⌋
2
)]]
≥
∑
i
Evi

1[i∈I] (vi) ∑
j∈Gi(vi)
(
1−
1
α
)
{γ · qij(vi)}h
(
vij − pj
) .
Together these two deviations give us
2Ev

 ∑
i∈I(v)
∑
j
vij · qij(vi)

 ≥∑
i
Evi

1[i∈I] (vi) ∑
j∈Gi(vi)
(
1−
1
α
)
γ · qij(vi)
(
vij − pj
) . (10)
We further estimate the term
∑
i Evi [1[i∈I] (vi)
∑
j∈Gi(vi)
qij(vi)
(
vij − pj
)
] on the RHS of Equa-
tion (10), which can be rewritten as:
Ev

 ∑
i∈I(v)
∑
j∈Gi(vi)
(
vij − pj
)
· qij(vi)


= Ev

 ∑
i∈I(v)
∑
j
vij · qij(vi)−
∑
i∈I(v)
∑
j 6∈Gi(vi)
vij · qij(vi)−
∑
i∈I(v)
∑
j∈Gi(vi)
pj · qij(vi)


≥ Ev

 ∑
i∈I(v)
∑
j
vij · qij(vi)−
∑
i∈I(v)
∑
j 6∈Γi(vi)
vij · qij(vi)−
∑
i∈I(v)
∑
j
pj · qij(vi)


≥ Ev

 ∑
i∈I(v)
∑
j
vij · qij(vi)

− Ev

 ∑
i∈I(v)
∑
j 6∈Γi(vi)
vij · qij(vi)

 − α · REV(s), (11)
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where the first inequality holds as
∑
j 6∈Gi(vi)
vijqij(vi) ≤
∑
j 6∈Ji(vi)
vijqij(vi)+
∑
j 6∈Γi(vi)
vijqij(vi) and
vij < pj for every j /∈ Ji(vi), and the last inequality holds as Ev[
∑
i qij(vi)] = Ev[
∑
i qij(v)] ≤ 1.
Our next goal will be to bound the term Ev[
∑
i∈I(v)
∑
j 6∈Γi(vi)
vij · qij(vi)] on the RHS of Equa-
tion (11). Before that we need to do some preparations. To ease the notations we denote by j{ℓ}
the ℓth share of item j. We observe that the expected Liquid Welfare at equilibrium can be written
as LW(s) =
∑
i Ev[Eb∼s(v)[min{vi(xi), Bi(vi)}]]. We let LW(s(v)) =
∑
i Eb∼s(v)[min vi(xi), Bi(vi)],
so that we have LW(s) = Ev[LW(s(v))]. For any fixed valuation profile v, LW(s(v)) is given by:
∑
i
Prb∼s(v) [vi(xi) > Bi(vi)] ·Bi(vi) +
∑
i,j
h∑
ℓ=1
Prb∼s(v)
[
{vi(xi) ≤ Bi(vi)} ∧ {i wins j
{ℓ}}
]
·
vij
h
=
∑
i
Qi(v) ·Bi(vi) +
∑
i,j
vij
h
(
h∑
ℓ=1
Pr
[
i wins j{ℓ}
]
−
h∑
ℓ=1
Pr
[
{vi(xi) > Bi(vi)} ∧ {i wins j
{ℓ}}
])
=
∑
i
Qi(v) ·Bi(vi) +
∑
i,j
vij ·max
{
0 , qij(v) −
1
h
h∑
ℓ=1
Pr
[
{vi(xi) > Bi(vi)} ∧ {i wins j
{ℓ}}
]}
≥
∑
i
Qi(v) ·Bi(vi) +
∑
i,j
vij ·max {0, qij(v)−Pr [vi(xi) > Bi(vi)]}
=
∑
i
Qi(v) ·Bi(vi) +
∑
i,j
max {0, qij(v) −Qi(v)} · vij ,
where the second equality holds true as the expression inside the max cannot be negative and
qij(v) =
1
h
∑h
ℓ=1Pr[i wins j
{ℓ}] by definition of qij(v), the first inequality holds since Pr[vi(xi) >
Bi(vi)] ≥ Pr[{vi(xi) > Bi(vi)} ∧ {i wins j
{ℓ}}], and the last equality holds by definition of Qi(v).
Taking expectation over both sides, we have:
LW(s) ≥ Ev

 ∑
i∈I3(v)
Qi(v) · Bi(vi)

 + Ev

 ∑
i∈I(v)
∑
j
max {0, qij(v)−Qi(v)} · vij


≥
∑
i
Evi
[
1[i∈I3] (vi)Qi(vi) ·Bi(vi)
]
+
∑
i
Evi

1[i∈I] (vi) ∑
j 6∈Γi(vi)
(qij(vi)−Qi(vi)) · vij


≥
1
2γ
∑
i
Evi
[
1[i∈I3] (vi)Bi(vi)
]
+
1
2
∑
i
Evi

1[i∈I] (vi) ∑
j 6∈Γi(vi)
vij · qij(vi)


=
1
2γ
Ev

 ∑
i∈I3(v)
Bi(vi)

+ 1
2
Ev

 ∑
i∈I(v)
∑
j 6∈Γi(vi)
vij · qij(vi)

 , (12)
where to obtain the first inequality we restrict the set of players that we sum over; the second
inequality follows from the facts that qij(vi) = Ev-i [qij(v)] and Qi(vi) = Ev-i [Qi(v)], along with the
facts that max{0, qij(v)−Qi(v)} ≥ 0 (which we apply for j ∈ Γi(vi)) and max {0, qij(v)−Qi(v)} ≥
qij(v)−Qi(v) (which we apply for j 6∈ Γi(vi)); the third inequality holds since players i ∈ I3(v) have
Qi(vi) >
1
2γ , while for players i ∈ I(v) ⊆ I3(v) and items j 6∈ Γi(vi) we have Qi(vi) ≤
1
2 ·
1
γ
≤
qij(vi)
2 .
Now we rearrange terms from Equation (12) to get Ev[
∑
i∈I(v)
∑
j 6∈Γi(vi)
vijqij(vi)] ≤ 2 · LW(s) −
1
γ
Ev[
∑
i∈I3(v)
Bi(vi)]. Combining Equation (10) and Equation (11), we can substitute this upper
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bound to get:
2Ev

 ∑
i∈I(v)
∑
j
vij · qij(vi)


≥
(
1−
1
α
)
γ

Ev

 ∑
i∈I(v)
∑
j
vij · qij(vi)

− α ·REV(s)− 2 · LW(s) + 1
γ
Ev

 ∑
i∈I3(v)
Bi(vi)



 .
Dividing both sides by
(
1− 1
α
)
γ and rearranging terms gives the lemma:
(
1−
2α
γ(α− 1)
)
Ev

 ∑
i∈I(v)
∑
j
vij · qij(vi)

 ≤ α ·REV(s) + 2 · LW(s)− 1
γ
Ev

 ∑
i∈I3(v)
Bi(vi)

 .
Finally, we show that the Liquid Price of Anarchy of any Bayesian Nash equilibrium is bounded.
Theorem (Theorem 5). In simultaneous first-price auctions with n additive bidders and budgets
where every item has h equal shares (copies), the Liquid Price of Anarchy of Bayesian Nash equi-
libria is O
(
1 + n
h
)
(at most 51.5, when h ≥ n).
Proof. We combine the bounds from Lemma D.1 and Lemma D.2 and obtain
α · REV(s) + 2 · LW(s)−
1
γ
Ev

 ∑
i∈I3(v)
Bi(vi)

 ≥
(
1−
2α
γ(α− 1)
)(
1
2
−
1
2α
)OPT− α(1 + γ + n
h
)
REV(s)− Ev

 ∑
i∈I3(v)
Bi(vi)



 .
Since LW(s) ≥ REV(s) we further derive that(
α+ 2 +
1
2
(
1−
1
α
−
2
γ
)
α
(
1 + γ +
n
h
))
LW(s) ≥
1
2
(
1−
1
α
−
2
γ
)
OPT+
(
1
γ
−
1
2
(
1−
1
α
−
2
γ
))
Ev

 ∑
i∈I3(v)
Bi(vi)

 .
As long as the factor in front of Ev[
∑
i∈I3(v)
Bi(vi)] is nonnegative, we have OPT ≤ O
(
n
h
)
· LW(s)
for any 1 ≤ h ≤ n for a particular choice of parameters (e.g., α = 2.26, γ = 7.16). In particular,
when h ≥ n, we have that the LPoA is at most 51.5.
E Tightness Results for Simple Auctions
In this section, we show that Theorem B.2 and Theorem B.1 are essentially tight by giving an
explicit game for which the Liquid Price of Anarchy of both first price and second price auctions
is arbitrarily close to 2. In fact, agents in our lower bound only have additive valuation functions.
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Theorem. There is a simultaneous second price auction game and a simultaneous first price auc-
tion game which have a Nash equilibrium b such that the Liquid Price of Anarchy is arbitrarily
close to 2.
Proof. Consider a simultaneous second price auction game with m = 2 items and n = 2 players,
and fix any ǫ > 0. Player 1 has a budget of B1 = 10 − ǫ, and a value of 10 for item 1 and a value
of 0 for item 2. Player 2 has a budget of B2 = 10, and a value of 10 for both items. The player
valuations are additive, so their value for a bundle is simply the sum of the values of each item. The
optimal solution splits the two items between the two players, giving item 1 to player 1 and item 2
to player 2. The Liquid Welfare of this solution is OPT = min{v1({1}), B1}+min{v2({2}), B2} =
10− ǫ+ 10 = 20− ǫ.
On the other hand, there exists the following Nash equilibrium b. Suppose player 1 bids 0 for
both items, while player 2 bids 10 − ǫ2 for item 1 and
ǫ
2 for item 2. For these bids, player 2 wins
both items, which results in a Liquid Welfare of LW(b) = min{v2({1, 2}), B2} = 10. To see why b
is a Nash equilibrium, observe that player 1 is not interested in bidding for item 2 since their value
is 0 for the item. Moreover, player 1’s budget is not high enough to outbid player 2 for item 1, and
hence player 1’s utility cannot be improved (even though it is 0). Player 2’s utility is as high as
it can be, since player 2 gets both items and pays 0 for a utility of 20. Hence, the Liquid Price of
Anarchy is given by OPTLW(b) =
20−ǫ
10 .
The same setup shows that the Liquid Price of Anarchy of simultaneous first price auctions is
arbitrarily close to 2. In fact, for the same game, essentially the same Nash equilibrium b exists
for the first price auction setting. The only difference is that player 2 can improve their utility by
bidding less for the two items. If we assume that players’ bids must be multiples of some fixed
value, then player 2 must bid slightly above 0 for item 1 and slightly above 10 − ǫ for item 2, and
now player 2 cannot improve their utility by bidding less, since doing so may result in losing one
or more items.
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